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Our book on the Eurozone crisis is built on two central premises; a substantive
one and a methodological one. According to the substantive premise the Eurozone
crisis has not been merely an economic crisis and a crisis of the European
macroeconomic constitution but has had significant consequences in the dimensions
of the political and social constitution as well. This substantive premise is linked
to our understanding of the European constitution as a multidimensional and
multitemporal process of constitutionalisation. The methodological premise concerns
the relationship between constitutional and economic analysis. Our objective has
not been to complement constitutional with economic analysis but to treat economic
analysis as an integral part of constitutional analysis.
Based on these premises, our discussion proceeds through five stages. First we
summarize the main principles of what we call the Maastricht macroeconomic
constitution. These include Europeanization of monetary policy; the independence
of the ECB and price stability as the constitutionally anchored  objective of 
monetary policy conducted by an independent expert body; as well as Member State
sovereignty in fiscal policy and, as its reverse, Member State fiscal liability, manifest
in the no-bailout prohibition.
The Maastricht principles relied on particular economic assumptions the
reconstruction of which is the second stage of our analysis. As regards monetary
policy and the institutional position of the ECB, the assumptions concern, for
example, the role of inflation and the major task of central banks in combating it. The
post-Keynesian consensus which emerged in the 1980s was an important factor
facilitating the establishment of EMU after a long run-up phase. The Maastricht
principles gave expression to an optimistic view of the EU approaching an optimal
currency area, where completion of the single market would produce the factor
mobility necessary for absorbing asymmetric economic shocks and pursuing
common monetary policy. In turn, the no-bailout clause manifested a confidence
in the disciplining effects of financial markets on Member State finances. Yet, an
awareness of the limitations of market discipline also existed, which explains the
emphasis put on the monitoring procedures established in Maastricht and further
specified by the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact, in particular the excessive deficit
procedure. A sovereign debt crisis was not seen as a possibility or, if it was, the
assumption was that the prohibition on bailouts would be taken seriously and the
Member State at issue would need to resolve the situation, even using default as
a last measure. Consequently, no crisis resolution mechanism was included in
the Maastricht constitution. In turn, prevention (and resolution) of financial crises
was deemed to be primarily a national responsibility, and no Union-level resolution
mechanisms were designed to meet them, either.
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In the third stage, we turn to the economic developments which culminated in the
Eurozone crisis. We examine these developments on the basis of the economic
assumptions the Maastricht principles implied. Some central assumptions have
not met the test of reality. Achieving optimal currency area has proved to be less
automatic than the Maastricht optimists expected. The fiscal constraints imposed
by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact were not able to prevent
a sovereign debt crisis in several Member States, while the financial integration of
the euro area, as well as the links between banks and sovereigns, made default
by a Member State at least politically unacceptable. Invalidation of essential
economic assumptions led to the shaking of essential principles of the Maastricht
macroeconomic constitution. We show this in the fourth stage of our analysis. The
financial stability of the euro area as a whole has been elevated into a primary
overriding objective of European economic, including monetary, measures. The ECB
has been deeply involved in resolving the financial and fiscal crises, which has had
repercussions for its independence and led it to interpret its constitutionally defined
mandate rather liberally. Yet, perhaps most dramatic are the consequences for
Member States’ fiscal liability and sovereignty.
The rescue packages and mechanisms, starting with the Greek loan facility in
May 2010 and including the launch of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in
October 2012, signified a retreat from the no-bailout provision and the underlying
principle of exclusive Member State fiscal liability. In Pringle, the ECJ not only
constitutionally sanctioned the rescue packages and mechanisms produced by the
experimentalism of the preceding two and a half years; it also confirmed that the
macroeconomic constitution has been complemented with and modified by three
new elements. First, with regard to Member State fiscal policy, the macroeconomic
constitution provides not only for crisis prevention but for crisis management as
well. The bailout prohibition is valid only for preventive purposes; in a situation of
threatening insolvency of a Member State, bailout measures may be permissible.
Secondly, preventive fiscal policy constraints and crisis resolution share the same
higher objective of financial stability of the euro area as a whole; this higher objective
also justifies divergence from strict compliance with the bailout prohibition. And,
thirdly, crisis resolution by means of financial assistance for the purpose of financial
stability of the euro area as a whole is only permitted if accompanied by strict
conditionality imposed on the recipient state.
Pringle, complemented by the amendment of Art. 136 TFEU confirming Member
States’ competence to establish a stability mechanism, not only retreated from
the principle of Member State responsibility; by elevating conditionality of financial
assistance to a constitutional principle these constitutional speech acts  also
conferred constitutional legitimacy on the curtailment of recipient states’ sovereignty
in fiscal (and economic) policy. The fiscal sovereignty of the assisting Member
States has not been spared from restrictions either. The liabilities related to rescue
operations and mechanisms are huge and, if realised, would considerably curb
Member States’ budgetary autonomy, perhaps even affecting their ability to meet
their constitutional fiscal obligations.
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The leeway of Member States’ fiscal and economic policies has been further
reduced by the tightening of general European economic governance; here the
catchwords are the six- and two-pack, and the Fiscal Compact. With the monitoring
procedures established by Articles 121 and 126 TFEU and further specified by
the Stability and Growth Pact, decisive steps have been taken from soft-law
instruments to formal sanctions. Introduction of voting based on reversed majorities
has strengthened the Commission’s position; this, together with formal sanctions,
has stripped governance of much of its peer review character. With introduction
of the new excessive imbalances procedure, the scope of surveillance has been
enlarged from fiscal to general macroeconomic policy. In fiscal policy, monitoring has
been extended from Member States’ multi-annual planning to both substantive and
procedural aspects of annual budgetary processes.
The fifth, concluding, stage focuses on the repercussions of the crisis and the
mutations of the macroeconomic constitution for the political and social constitutions;
in particular, democracy and social rights. Here we discuss the adoption by
expert bodies, such as the ECB and the Commission, of stakeholder and political
roles, which raises new kinds of accountability and legitimacy concerns; the rise
of a new intergovernmentalism; the weakening of the two-stage mechanism of
democratic input legitimation; the shaking foundations of the Union as a “Community
based on the rule of law”; and the failure of European social rights protection. Our
book on the Eurozone crisis is built on two central premises; a substantive one
and a methodological one. According to the substantive premise the Eurozone
crisis has not been merely an economic crisis and a crisis of the European
macroeconomic constitution but has had significant consequences in the dimensions
of the political and social constitution as well. This substantive premise is linked
to our understanding of the European constitution as a multidimensional and
multitemporal process of constitutionalisation. The methodological premise concerns
the relationship between constitutional and economic analysis. Our objective has
not been to complement constitutional with economic analysis but to treat economic
analysis as an integral part of constitutional analysis.
Based on these premises, our discussion proceeds through five stages. First we
summarize the main principles of what we call the Maastricht macroeconomic
constitution. These include Europeanization of monetary policy; the independence
of the ECB and price stability as the constitutionally anchored  objective of 
monetary policy conducted by an independent expert body; as well as Member State
sovereignty in fiscal policy and, as its reverse, Member State fiscal liability, manifest
in the no-bailout prohibition.
The Maastricht principles relied on particular economic assumptions the
reconstruction of which is the second stage of our analysis. As regards monetary
policy and the institutional position of the ECB, the assumptions concern, for
example, the role of inflation and the major task of central banks in combating it. The
post-Keynesian consensus which emerged in the 1980s was an important factor
facilitating the establishment of EMU after a long run-up phase. The Maastricht
principles gave expression to an optimistic view of the EU approaching an optimal
currency area, where completion of the single market would produce the factor
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mobility necessary for absorbing asymmetric economic shocks and pursuing
common monetary policy. In turn, the no-bailout clause manifested a confidence
in the disciplining effects of financial markets on Member State finances. Yet, an
awareness of the limitations of market discipline also existed, which explains the
emphasis put on the monitoring procedures established in Maastricht and further
specified by the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact, in particular the excessive deficit
procedure. A sovereign debt crisis was not seen as a possibility or, if it was, the
assumption was that the prohibition on bailouts would be taken seriously and the
Member State at issue would need to resolve the situation, even using default as
a last measure. Consequently, no crisis resolution mechanism was included in
the Maastricht constitution. In turn, prevention (and resolution) of financial crises
was deemed to be primarily a national responsibility, and no Union-level resolution
mechanisms were designed to meet them, either.
In the third stage, we turn to the economic developments which culminated in the
Eurozone crisis. We examine these developments on the basis of the economic
assumptions the Maastricht principles implied. Some central assumptions have
not met the test of reality. Achieving optimal currency area has proved to be less
automatic than the Maastricht optimists expected. The fiscal constraints imposed
by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact were not able to prevent
a sovereign debt crisis in several Member States, while the financial integration of
the euro area, as well as the links between banks and sovereigns, made default
by a Member State at least politically unacceptable. Invalidation of essential
economic assumptions led to the shaking of essential principles of the Maastricht
macroeconomic constitution. We show this in the fourth stage of our analysis. The
financial stability of the euro area as a whole has been elevated into a primary
overriding objective of European economic, including monetary, measures. The ECB
has been deeply involved in resolving the financial and fiscal crises, which has had
repercussions for its independence and led it to interpret its constitutionally defined
mandate rather liberally. Yet, perhaps most dramatic are the consequences for
Member States’ fiscal liability and sovereignty.
The rescue packages and mechanisms, starting with the Greek loan facility in
May 2010 and including the launch of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in
October 2012, signified a retreat from the no-bailout provision and the underlying
principle of exclusive Member State fiscal liability. In Pringle, the ECJ not only
constitutionally sanctioned the rescue packages and mechanisms produced by the
experimentalism of the preceding two and a half years; it also confirmed that the
macroeconomic constitution has been complemented with and modified by three
new elements. First, with regard to Member State fiscal policy, the macroeconomic
constitution provides not only for crisis prevention but for crisis management as
well. The bailout prohibition is valid only for preventive purposes; in a situation of
threatening insolvency of a Member State, bailout measures may be permissible.
Secondly, preventive fiscal policy constraints and crisis resolution share the same
higher objective of financial stability of the euro area as a whole; this higher objective
also justifies divergence from strict compliance with the bailout prohibition. And,
thirdly, crisis resolution by means of financial assistance for the purpose of financial
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stability of the euro area as a whole is only permitted if accompanied by strict
conditionality imposed on the recipient state.
Pringle, complemented by the amendment of Art. 136 TFEU confirming Member
States’ competence to establish a stability mechanism, not only retreated from
the principle of Member State responsibility; by elevating conditionality of financial
assistance to a constitutional principle these constitutional speech acts  also
conferred constitutional legitimacy on the curtailment of recipient states’ sovereignty
in fiscal (and economic) policy. The fiscal sovereignty of the assisting Member
States has not been spared from restrictions either. The liabilities related to rescue
operations and mechanisms are huge and, if realised, would considerably curb
Member States’ budgetary autonomy, perhaps even affecting their ability to meet
their constitutional fiscal obligations.
The leeway of Member States’ fiscal and economic policies has been further
reduced by the tightening of general European economic governance; here the
catchwords are the six- and two-pack, and the Fiscal Compact. With the monitoring
procedures established by Articles 121 and 126 TFEU and further specified by
the Stability and Growth Pact, decisive steps have been taken from soft-law
instruments to formal sanctions. Introduction of voting based on reversed majorities
has strengthened the Commission’s position; this, together with formal sanctions,
has stripped governance of much of its peer review character. With introduction
of the new excessive imbalances procedure, the scope of surveillance has been
enlarged from fiscal to general macroeconomic policy. In fiscal policy, monitoring has
been extended from Member States’ multi-annual planning to both substantive and
procedural aspects of annual budgetary processes.
The fifth, concluding, stage focuses on the repercussions of the crisis and the
mutations of the macroeconomic constitution for the political and social constitutions;
in particular, democracy and social rights. Here we discuss the adoption by expert
bodies, such as the ECB and the Commission, of stakeholder and political roles,
which raises new kinds of accountability and legitimacy concerns; the rise of a new
intergovernmentalism; the weakening of the two-stage mechanism of democratic
input legitimation; the shaking foundations of the Union as a “Community based on
the rule of law”; and the failure of European social rights protection.
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